

### Implications of recent developments on the future arms control agenda

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## **Implications of Recent Developments on the Future Arms Control Agenda<sup>\*</sup>**

In its first-ever global “*security strategy*”, presented by *Javier Solana*, High Representative for the EU’s *Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP)*, and meanwhile confirmed by the heads of state and government of the EU at the *European Council* in *Thessaloniki* on June 19-20, 2003, the EU has now recognized and confirmed new *global* security threats (i.e. international terrorism and proliferation of mass destruction weapons). It brings the EU’s security concerns broadly in line with that of the United States. This highly important document is serving as the basis for a officially declared *European Security Strategy* to be adopted by the *European Council* in December 2003. The new strategy is explicitly calling for extending the zone of security around Europe and to develop *strategic partnerships* not just with the United States, Canada and Japan, but also with China and India due to their important security role “*in their respective regions and beyond*”. In another new key document, the *Declaration of Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction*, the EU has outlined its key policy objective of the *Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP)* as well as its *European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)*, “*to deter, halt and, where possible, reverse proliferation programs of concern worldwide*.” For the very first time, it does no longer exclude the use of force as a last resort and the most extreme coercive measure if political and diplomatic measures have failed. In this regard, the EU is developing and implementing an *EU Action Plan* as a matter of priority. Furthermore, in another declaration concerning the ambivalent nature of Iran’s civilian nuclear program, it is not only warning Teheran to develop and acquire nuclear weapons, for the very first time the EU is even threatening Iran to suspend its economic trade and cooperation programs.

While the EU also recognizes the importance of traditional arms control regimes, national export controls and even coercive measures in accordance with the UN charter as important instruments to shape international relations, it simultaneously sees none as sufficient in itself.

For more than 30 years, the policy arena of nuclear arms control remained very stable. Throughout this period, “*arms control*” had been defined as carefully negotiated multilateral or bilateral agreements with legally binding measures to implement them. The historical record of international arms control efforts to curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), however, is rather mixed. On the one hand, previous forecasts of 20 nuclear powers by 1970 made in the 1960s by U.S. experts have never become true. The number had reached nine by 1990, including four undeclared nuclear powers (Israel, Pakistan, India, and South Africa). In addition, shortly afterwards, South Africa decided to

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dismantle its six nuclear bombs. Moreover, in the first half of the 1990s, a horizontal nuclear proliferation after the implosion of the former Soviet Union (FSU) with new emerging nuclear powers on its territory (such as Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan) has been successfully prevented.

On the other hand, several strategic developments in recent years have called the former arms control agenda and traditional mechanisms and instruments into question. The new US-administration, for instance, has from the very beginning (and not just after September 11, 2001) broken with the former arms control philosophy by emphasizing often unilateral actions and by discarding arms control mechanisms, agreements and regimes that might contradict US security interests. But it has also announced reductions in U.S. strategic nuclear forces to a level of 1,700-2,200 deployed warheads, and declared on December 13, 2001 its intention to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty within six months. The Bush-government interpreted the ABM-treaty as a relic of the Cold War which hampers the ability of the United States to defend itself (BMD). Therewith, the offensive-defensive arms control approach struck 30 years ago that enabled considerable reductions in strategic offensive nuclear forces over time, has been given up. It has sparked widespread fears of an return to the old arms race paradigm — albeit those fears are overdrawn and ultimately unrealistic in regard to a new US-Russian arms race.

The *Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)*, delivered to the Congress in January 2002 and explained to the public since March 2002, calls to draft contingency plans for the use of nuclear weapons against at least seven countries, naming the “axis of evil” — Iraq, Iran, and North Korea — but also Libya and Syria and even Russia and China. To some extent, it also reverses an almost two-decade-long trend of relegating nuclear weapons to the category of weapons of last resort and redefines nuclear requirements in post-September 11 terms. In the same month, President Bush stated: *“In preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, there is nor margin for error and no chance to learn from mistakes. Our coalition must act deliberately, but inaction is not an option. Men with no respect for life must never be allowed to control the ultimate instruments of death.”*

Most recently, however, the Bush-administration announced plans for initiating a research and development program of a new generation of small tactical nuclear arms to destroy enemy deep buried bunkers to dissuade nuclear threshold states from ever building deep bunkers. But whether these plans will really stop the proliferation by deterring nuclear threshold states or whether the new plans will rather fasten proliferation of WMD is open for discussion. But the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have definitively weakened further all international arms control efforts, non-proliferation regimes and existing verification as well international inspections measures.

Furthermore, war against international terrorism in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the continuing nuclear tensions between India and Pakistan, the recent invasion of Iraq, and the ongoing nuclear stalemate on the Korean Peninsula have raised the question whether the former existing arms control philosophy is still adequate and relevant towards the new rising security challenges and the proliferation of mass destruction weapons (MDW; including ballistic missiles). Are the more informal, unilateral arms control measures of the U.S. and its efforts to fight WMD with WMD are a more adequate and sufficient instrument to cope with the new global and regional security challenges? In general it seems that we could manage the processes but not to stop them always and entirely. The reason therefore is simply: availability. The more states have WMD, the more available becomes the necessary technology and know how on the global scale — in particular for non-state terrorist groups and organizations. Consequently, new vulnerabilities have been exposed in a way with the September 11, 2001 attacks that were not appreciated previously to a sufficient extent. The newly established distribution networks, for instance, consisting of lesser-developed nations (also called “secondary proliferators” such as North Korea and Iran), could help other countries to circumvent existing non-proliferation regimes to obtain the materials and equipment needed to develop nuclear weapons.

In this light, of contradicting trends in the field of global arms control and non-proliferation policies, I will at first analyze the recent *SORT-Treaty* of May 2002 and take a look what has changed vis-à-vis the former *SALT-* and *START-treaties* between the United States and Russia because the future international arms control agenda and global non-proliferation

efforts depend very much on the stability and strategic cooperation between the U.S. and Russia. Then I will draw the attention to already disturbing trends in the proliferation of mass destruction weapons (particularly nuclear proliferation) since the second half of the 1990s by reviewing the MTCR and new initiatives to curb ballistic missile proliferation. It will be followed by an overview of the recent the nuclear stalemate on the Korean peninsula, the questions linked with WMD and the South Asian nuclear challenges. Finally, I will also address the nuclear terrorist challenge after September 11, 2001.

### **The Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty of May 2002: Prospects for Further Arms Control Negotiations?**

In regard to *Article VI* of the *Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)*, under the nuclear weapon states agreed toward eventual nuclear disarmament, downsizing the US and Russian strategic nuclear weapons arsenals is important for the viability and credibility of the Western non-proliferation efforts to curb the global spread of WMD.

The new *Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT)*, signed on 24 May 2002 between the US and Russian presidents at their Moscow summit meeting, will not change very much on Russia's side in regard to its *Strategic Nuclear Forces (SNF)*. But both sides agreed to cut their "*operationally deployed strategic warheads*" to 1,700-2,200 each — approximately two-thirds from their present strategic nuclear arsenals over a 10-year period. The treaty, composed of just 485 words in five articles, however does not define which strategic warheads it covers (or what "*operationally deployed strategic warheads*" really mean. Indeed, Russia has a different interpretation) nor how those are to be counted. The US side was primarily interested in as much flexibility as possible, including having the possibility to quickly re-deploy warheads which have been removed from delivery vehicles such as ballistic missiles and bombers. By 2012, it is expected that the US will have deployed 2,200 strategic weapons and retain an additional 2,400 in an operationally maintained status of "*responsive capability*".

The final negotiations revealed on one hand the new strategic quality of the US-Russian relations after 11 September 2001, and on the other hand the following three facts which are often overlooked by Western critics of the *SORT*:

1. The more Russia's strategic nuclear forces have declined over the last decade, the more it is Russia (and not the US) that is primarily interested in an agreed treaty on the strategic nuclear forces of both sides as well as an inspection regime similar to the existing one for *START-I*.
2. But simultaneously, the better the bilateral relationship develops between Washington and Moscow, the less important becomes the treaty for both sides. The strategic relationship between the US and Russia is already moving from one of *Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD)* of the Cold War period into one of *Mutual Assured Security (MAS)*. Negotiated arms control then will have only residual importance. The Bush administration has already declared that it seeks a nuclear relationship with Russia similar to those between the US and its nuclear allies of Great Britain and France, where a strategic nuclear arms control or arms reduction treaty is no longer necessary.
3. Interestingly, the critics of the new treaty in Moscow as well as in Washington and Europe seem to cling much more to the Cold War period and a mutual threat perception (or at least a lasting mutual mistrust) than those supporting the new treaty who are mostly concerned about very different threats in the world.

But critics, too, admit that lowering the number of deployed warheads decreases the number of warheads ready for quick use — therewith reducing risks of an unauthorized or accidental launch due to Russia's deteriorating early-warning capability. Nonetheless, it is understandable that Russia sought rules that would count warheads according to the maximum number any deployed delivery vehicle could carry similar to those of *START-I*. While the new *SORT* offers each side a much greater flexibility, at the same time it offers little predictability in regard to future strategic nuclear force structure — a central purpose of all former nuclear arms control treaties, but also the consequence of their former and to some extent still existing mutual threat perceptions. In many ways, the warheads Russia

keeps in storage (not the ones it has deployed on its ICBMs, bombers, and submarines) may well be the greater nuclear threat to the United States.

For Russia, the new treaty seems to offer a possibility it long has sought: to re-MIRV its ICBMs. In the Russian view, the combination of the end of the operational lifetimes of more than 60 percent of Russia's ICBMs, very low procurement rates of just 6-10 new missiles during the last four years and the transition to light ballistic missiles with single or few warheads, is leading to a radical decline in Russia's SNF around 2010. Therewith, a nuclear balance with a rising nuclear power such as China that has its own modernization program for strategic nuclear forces, including an expensive program to develop MIRV warheads for its new ICBMs and SLBMs after 2010 is only a question of time. However, given the operational lifetimes of its older SS-18, SS-19, SS-24 and SS-25 ICBMs and the re-direction of financial resources away from strategic nuclear forces towards conventional forces, Russia might have only funds for re-MIRVing its new *Topol-M* ICBMs with three nuclear warheads in the future. Given the present production rate of just two to six new ICBMs a year, Russia may only be able to increase its strategic nuclear arsenal of around 1,000 warheads by not more than 100-200 warheads before 2010-2015. Even the new *SORT*, that allows a re-MIRVing, thus will not solve the underlying structural problems of Russia's future SNF but will just buy some limited time. In general, the criticism of many arms control adherents vis-à-vis *SORT* is in many ways overdrawn and does not take into account the completely changing security environment and mutual threat perceptions of *both* sides. Furthermore, the U.S., NATO and Russia have announced to work together on *BMD* and *TMD*. However, albeit a first-strike scenario is no longer the underlying threat assumption, both sides may need reassurance and mutual trust that only a robust transparency regime can provide.

Furthermore, the *Bush*-administration's nuclear arms policies to discuss new weapons and an eventual resumption of nuclear testing may not really lead to a new arms race (Russia and China are unable to compete). However, it could make the task of banning the spread of nuclear weapons even more difficult that could severely threaten world security. In order to develop and produce them, testing would be required that by itself could trigger a global reaction cycle that would harm international security. Both the PRC and Russia might resume testing and both seem already to wait that they can blame the US scraping the CTBT.

Meanwhile, the PRC has surprisingly announced to be ready for talks on preventing an arms race in space even if they were not specifically aimed at a binding treaty. It was interpreted by the Chinese side as a major compromise aimed at injecting life into the long-stalled *Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD)*. Russia, which like the PRC had earlier argued -- in the face of US refusal -- for formal negotiations on a global agreement barring weaponry from space, hailed the PRC shift and told the 65-nation forum it would be ready to join in. Both powers, known to be deeply concerned over US plans for a *Ballistic National Missile Defense system (BMD)*, said they hoped the move would clear the way for talks on space arms and other disarmament issues to get under way soon. Just a week ago in an obvious reference to NMD they told the CD, currently holding a three-months summer session, that the danger of "*weaponization*" of outer space was growing and had to be tackled promptly. There was no immediate response from the US but it seems rather unlikely that the *Bush*-administration will agree to such talks given the heavy dependence on its war-fighting posture and *BMD*-plans on satellite-based reconnaissance, targeting and command and C<sup>3</sup>I.

While another downsizing of the US and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals look rather unlikely for the time being, sub-strategic (or tactical) nuclear weapons need to become a matter for discussion between both sides due to the dangers of terrorist thefts from insecure Russian arsenals and lack of adequate safeguards in other nuclear weapon states (i.e. India, Pakistan and China). But given the relative and still increasing manifold weaknesses of Russia's conventional armed forces and its first-use doctrine as well as the *Bush* administration's new interest at least at a research and development program of new tactical nuclear warheads, it seems equally rather remote that the issue of sub-strategic nuclear weapons will return to the U.S.-Russian arms control dialogue in the foreseeable future.

## Disturbing Strategic Trends in the Second Half of the 1990s

In contrast to many positive developments in the field of global non-proliferation and denuclearization efforts in the first half of the 1990s, however, a number of other regional and global trends and their security implications put the goal of a nuclear free world in question, at least in near and mid-term perspective:

- (1) The implosion of the nuclear superpower USSR and the resulting proliferation problems have created new potential proliferation threats to both Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. Although any nuclear war between the U.S. and Russia seems nowadays more remote than ever, Russia is still facing numerous dismantling problems and costs that aggravate problems of reforming its armed forces and coping successfully with the challenges of the nuclear legacy of the former Soviet Union ("*Cooperative Threat Reduction/CTR*" programs). These challenges include the following two potential threats in the near future: a) increasing risks of the loss of command and control over nuclear weapons, both politically and militarily, that might lead to accidental or inadvertent and unsanctioned or unauthorized use of them; and b) an illicit export of nuclear materials and expertise to potential nuclear threshold countries. A very important element of the CTR-programs was preventing the leakage of material and technologies as well as equipment to sub-state actors in order to prevent them to proliferate those capabilities to nuclear state actors/threshold states such as Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea and others. A joint stewardship of their nuclear weapon stockpiles and disposition of Cold War-era nuclear weapons and materials will remain an important element in the joint US-Russia cooperation in the next decades.
- (2) Any proliferation of mass destruction weapons or even an unlimited proliferation of advanced conventional weapon systems and the increasing technology diffusion might fuel the already ongoing arms build-up and arms competition in East Asia. It could lead to an open arms race, increasing risks of misperception, miscalculation and misunderstanding and finally to a violent outbreak of potential conflicts, so undermining the stability and security in the region. Against this background, new potential proliferation threats must be addressed in the dynamic and highly fluid security landscape of the Asia-Pacific region. The new security threats in this regard lies not just in the spread of WMD, but also in the "strategic cultures" of the second age nuclear powers such as India, Pakistan, North Korea and possibly also Iran. They are willing, for instance, to cannibalizing their conventional forces to finance their ballistic missile and WMD ambitions. In a major crisis, however, those efforts could erode the traditional restraints on the use of WMD (such as to suing them earlier).
- (3) Although nuclear-weapon-free zones have been established in the South Pacific - such as the 1985 *Treaty of Rarotonga* (the *South Pacific Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone* or *SPNWFZ*) and Southeast Asia (the 1995 *South East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone* or *SEANWFZ*), it remains an open question whether they are effective instruments for successful regional and global non-proliferation policies. Ultimately, they are dependent on the support of the nuclear weapon states — the US, Russia, China, France and Great Britain — and their national security interests. These interests are not always and exclusively defined by broader regional or global security concerns but often to more narrow national security interests. Characteristically, the support of the nuclear powers for these two nuclear-weapon-free zones was and is still limited (*SPNWFZ*) or so far even non-existent (*SEANWFZ*). Given European experiences, nuclear-weapon-free zones might promote confidence and security building measures (*CSBMs*), but can hardly be the major or the only non-proliferation instrument. Therefore, the analysis of motivations and the internal as well as external security environment of potential nuclear threshold countries remains an important prerequisite for defining specific and successful non-proliferation strategies.
- (4) Moreover, as the result of the dynamic economic growth and population increase in the Asia-Pacific region, the energy demand in the next decades will increase several times (particularly in China). Given the limited existence of energy resources, almost all states in East Asia are looking into the available options, notably the civilian use of nuclear power. But the creation of new nuclear power stations, nuclear fuel fabrication, spent fuel storage

and nuclear storage sites will raise considerable non-proliferation concerns because the boundaries between the civilian and military use of nuclear energy are often small.

- (5) Furthermore, new trends in Russia's and China's military policies indicate either a greater reliance on nuclear weapons both for prestige and compensating mounting deficiencies of its conventional forces or an accelerating modernization process (as it is the case in China). The latter might not only increase the accuracy of missiles and other technical parameter, but also expand its current nuclear arsenal two or three times in the next 10-15 years.
- (6) Such a future nuclear arms build-up of China might also rise and justify nuclear ambitions of other East Asian countries, notably Japan, Taiwan and South Korea (or a unified Korea after the collapse of North Korea). Japan, for instance, is already confronted by ambitions of two *de facto* and one potential nuclear power (Russia, China and North Korea) in the Asia-Pacific Rim. It might have a direct or indirect impact on its security, particularly if the U.S. would withdraw from the region or if the U.S. nuclear umbrella as a positive security guarantee for Japan would lose its credibility. Moreover, the Indian-Pakistani nuclear arms race and their weaponry programs have also destabilizing effects on Southeast and Northeast Asian states because it threatens the crucial sea links for their trade and energy flows and undermines regional CSBMs.

The expansion of technology that has an dominant influence in lives of most people presents certainly numerous benefits and opportunities, but at the same time it poses also new security challenges. The globalization of economies and technology availability provide new opportunities for terrorists with a power of modern weaponry and transnational links which are unprecedented in human experience. The example of the *AUM-Shinrikyo* Doomsday Cult and its use of chemical weapons in 1995 had already (and long before September 11, 2001) underscored those grave hazards with new dimensions. But it was the terrorists attacks on the *World Trade Center* and the *Pentagon* that has changed the world and the conventional wisdom. They had profound impact on how in particular the United States views its vulnerability to terrorism — a changed threat perception which has affected a wide range of U.S. policies related to non-proliferation and traditional arms control.

### Containing Ballistic Missile Proliferation

For many years, the proliferation of ballistic missiles has been a major international security concern. In the past, international efforts were centered on the *Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)*, which has a mixed record. The *MTCR* — which is not a treaty that bans missiles — has sought to curb missile proliferation by denying regional powers the technology to build ballistic missiles. According to UN statistics, currently at about 30 countries possess missiles of different classes. After World War II, ballistic missiles were used in at least five different military conflicts and cruise missiles in nine cases. In the second half of the 1990s, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Iran and Israel tested successfully medium-range missiles, whereas other states also have expanded their missile programs. These developments demonstrated the limits of the regime. Furthermore, North Korea has emerged in the 1990s as the leading missile exporter in the world: an estimated 400 Scud-B and -C missiles to Iran and Syria while Scud components (such as engines etc.) had been delivered to Egypt, Syria, Yemen and possibly Libya, as well as *Nodong* missiles and components to Pakistan and Iran. Moreover, although China has adopted new laws and has strengthened bureaucratic control of its arms exports, it is accused by the U.S. that Chinese companies continued to transfer missile-related industrial technology to Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria and Pakistan.

MTCR members have meanwhile drafted the *International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICCBM)*. In November 2002, 93 countries signed the code, which calls on states to make their missile development programs more transparent. Its most important provisions are two transparency-increasing CBMs: 1. issuing annual declarations explaining their BM and space-launch vehicle policies; and 2. providing advance notice of missile and space rocket launches). In this regard, though these transparency measures can be seen as

a pragmatic instrument, they do not establish effective legal barriers and norms against missile possession, development, and testing. Furthermore, missile-possessing states such as China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria did not sign the code so far. Under these circumstances, the code's CBMs are unlikely to stop the global missile proliferation. Whether the Russian proposal of a *Global System of Control over the Non-Proliferation of Missiles and Missile Technologies* (GCS) in 1999 which also aims to raise transparency of Missile launches, providing security guarantees to states renouncing possession of missile delivery vehicles of WMD, encouraging and stimulating such states, and holding regular consultations in order to improve the system and to address disputed matters would really change the picture on ongoing proliferation activities by certain states is equally uncertain, but could at least improve the activities in the field of CBMs.

### **The South Asian Nuclear Challenges**

The lifting of the *Glenn*, *Pressler*, and *Symington* Amendment sanctions on the U.S. side can be seen as the most significant indicator that the *Bush*-Administration has quietly accepted the fact that India is a nuclear weapon state. Even in the case that the *Bush*-Administration will not necessarily recognize India as an official nuclear weapon state, India will be treated one. This important US shift should not be explained primarily by the September 11 events of 2001 but rather in the already earlier started shifts of US foreign and security policy vis-à-vis India (the decision to lift the sanctions was taken before September 11 because the US also felt the sanctions simply were not working). Pakistan, by contrast, is a different case because the lifting of all sanctions was triggered primarily by the practical need of cooperation with Pakistan after the September 11 events.

The current Indian-Pakistani nuclear and conventional balances — even in the view of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear strategic communities — are still fundamentally unstable and asymmetrical. Although both South Asian rivals have apparently not assembled or stockpiled many operational nuclear weapons, they can create small nuclear armed forces in a short time. But they have not been able to acquire secure nuclear forces with a second-strike-capability and an adequate as well as an effective command, control, communication and computer (C<sup>4</sup>I) and intelligence system as a fundamental prerequisite for a stable mutual deterrence relationship despite the fact that both sides have introduced some CBMs in regard to their nuclear forces. Given the lack of these factors, the failing transparency and confidence in each other's command and control arrangements as well as dangers of crisis escalation in their bilateral relations, particularly over the *Kashmir*-conflict, their current nuclear postures still involve inherent risks of pre-emptive strikes, possibilities of accidents, unauthorized use, mishandling, misunderstanding and misperception. In both countries, the essential link between nuclear transparency, nuclear stability and a corresponding nuclear infrastructure with CBMs and early warning systems as part of the C<sup>4</sup>I structure has largely been overlooked in debates of nuclear deterrence and nuclear crisis management in the past.

For the time being, the US policy towards Pakistan will focus that the country remains a moderate Islamic state and exert strong pressure on Islamabad to continue its policy of strategic restraint (such as cutting Pakistan's support for the Taliban in Afghanistan). If India and Pakistan can be persuaded to restrain their nuclear capabilities and to increase CBMs, it would also help Washington to promote a broader proliferation agenda on a global scale.

### **Nuclear Challenges of the North Korean Peninsula — Implications of September 11, 2001 and the Iraq-Conflict**

Despite the focus of the Taiwan Strait conflict of the *Bush*-Administration before September 11, 2001, North Korea has also been singled out as one of the most dangerous threats to US security not only because of its own continuing missile program, which in its current two-stage configuration might be capable of striking Alaska, Hawaii and parts of the continental



United States, but also of its missile exports and technology transfers to South Asia and the Middle East. On October 4, 2002, North Korea surprisingly admitted that it is still conducting a nuclear weapons program despite the *Geneva 1994 Agreed Framework* and the *KEDO* program to build two light-water reactors in North Korea as a compensation for giving up its former nuclear weapons program. One year later, Pyongyang still defends aggressively its stance, raising concerns in the region and beyond that North Korea is becoming the next target of the US war on terrorism, its sponsors and WMD. Thus far, however, the *Bush-Administration* has declared not to use military means as in the Iraq case but rather the diplomatic instrument.

In January 2003, North Korea pulled out of the nuclear *NPT* and has restarted in the same month its mothballed reactor at *Yongbyon*, north of Pyongyang, by reprocessing of the 8,000 spent fuel rods that they took out of storage. Although North Korea probably needs some time before it has sufficient highly-enriched uranium to make multiple nuclear warheads, it has sufficient plutonium to do so as well as to construct much less powerful radiological bombs to sell them to international terrorist groups.

Meanwhile, the PRC appears also to have concluded that the DPRK obtained enough uranium from a second clandestine program to make several more devices. Only after China has become diplomatically more concerned and active on the Korean peninsula, North Korea has now agreed to join multilateral talks with the US, China, Japan, South Korea and Russia instead of insisting on bilateral talks with the U.S. China played an unusually active key-role in persuading Pyongyang because (1) it has more nuclear weapon states in its direct neighborhood (Russia, India, Pakistan and North Korea) than any other country in the world, (2) it is fearing that other Asian powers (such as Japan, South Korea and even Taiwan) could also opt for a nuclear weapon option in an escalating crisis on the Korean Peninsula and (3) due to its increasing multifaceted economic, political and cultural ties with South Korea. Hence, Beijing's primary strategic interest is to keep stability on the Korean Peninsula in order to avoid undermining China's own economic growth and to dissuade Washington to place too much military power in the region. However, even multilateral security talks do not mean automatically a more realistic solution to the nuclear weapon challenges of North Korea. Pyongyang may find all kinds of excuses for stalling the negotiations, whilst it is continuing to build nuclear weapons.

As one of the lessons of the Iraq-conflict and the present nuclear questions concerning Iran's nuclear programs are teaching, only full and free inspections that go substantially beyond the limited access hitherto could establish the full scope of any DPRK nuclear weapons program. Whether Pyongyang has already operational warheads (free falling bombs or those for its ballistic missiles) or whether Pyongyang is just blackmailing the international community, is open for discussion. But any inspection regime in North Korea similar to the one now that took place in Iraq before the US military intervention needs to include the fact that North Korea is believed to have not less than almost 12,000 caves in which a secret uranium enrichment program or a covert plutonium effort can be hidden. Unlike in Iraq, where intrusive inspections had been conducted between 1991 and 1998, there had been only one routine inspection of Pyongyang's declared facilities — and that was conducted over a decade ago. A "*fully, verifiable and irreversible*" dismantling of North Korea's nuclear weapons program — as the *Bush administration* is demanding — means nothing less than of almost total transparency of the politically closest country today.

Furthermore, regardless of a future verification regime for North Korea, Pyongyang has demanded three conditions for any peaceful settlement of the new crisis:

- (1) the U.S. needs to recognize the DPRK's sovereignty;
- (2) Washington assures the DPRK of non-aggression and
- (3) The U.S. does not hinder the economic development of the DPRK.

While these North Korean conditions can be fulfilled in one or another way, it remains uncertain whether Pyongyang really cooperates with the *IAEA* in regard to a comprehensive inspection regime and will give up its newly revealed nuclear weapons program. As some commentators and experts have pointed out, the nuclear issue will not be solved except in the context of a broad Korean settlement, in which all the regional powers must be involved

in one or another way. But North Korea has also more cards to play than just the nuclear one. It is theoretically not excluded at all that it will give up its nuclear weapons program after a lengthy and frustrating negotiation process with the US. But it might have no interests at all the release the military pressure on South Korea at its common border given its overriding regime interests to survive and maintain some leverage towards Seoul and the US. Hitherto North Korea has not honored any international agreements and treaties and will, therefore, hardly rely on any peace treaty with the US as a real security treaty guarantee not being attacked by the US after the Iraq conflict has been solved in one or another way. Hence, it seems very questionable whether Pyongyang will give up not just its nuclear weapons program but also its chemical and biological weapons arsenal.

Furthermore, even US attempts to use the weapon of economic sanctions in order to push North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons program is controversial, risky and not guaranteed to succeed. It might result in the opposite what Washington tries to achieve: undermining further North's Korea economy and social situations that can lead to a collapse and widespread unrest. But it is also uncertain whether North Korea plays on time. It may also have defined the successful military intervention in Iraq in a way very differently what we think in the West: North Korea may rely on nuclear weapons even more in the future than before the Iraq conflict.

Until now, North Korea did not promise to suspend its nuclear program nor did it mention of receiving IAEA inspectors. For the time being, only the newly established six-party talks may offer a realistic framework for the coming months and years. But at the end of even those cooperative policies towards Pyongyang, all unresolved issues ultimately boil down to the North Korean regime interests and its survival that might hinder a peaceful "*great solution*" for the Korean peninsula. Although the hard-line and rather confrontational approach of the *Bush Administration* has also complicated a peaceful solution of the unresolved security problems on the Korean peninsula during the last two years, at the same time, the ability of North Korea to play diplomatic games or conducting blackmail policies on security issues has narrowed considerably during the last two years. Moreover, Washington's new Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) aimed at stopping the flow of WMD, has also increased the pressure on North Korea albeit containing the export and import of WMD materials and technologies can never be guaranteed to 100 percent.

The recent agreement to multilateral talks can also give Pyongyang new opportunities to drive wedges between the other five states and to split them apart in the new multilateral forum. Although all of these five states agree that North Korea has to give up its nuclear weapons, they disagree what the United States and others should offer and what kind of compensations they have to give to North Korea. Any common coercive policies of the U.S. which need to be backed by the other four states are highly uncertain in this context. The first round of talks should directed to the threat of nuclear and missile proliferation rather than North Korea's nuclear weapons themselves. But taking into account the interests and ramifications of all six actors, one can hardly be very optimistic as *Robert Einhorn*, a former senior nonproliferation official at the *State Department*, has recently stated:

"With the North Korean's sounding increasingly as if they are determined to acquire and retain nuclear weapons, and the deeply divided Bush administration ambivalent at best about reaching an agreement with a regime it considers untrustworthy and repugnant, there is little basis for optimism about the next round of Beijing talks."

## Nuclear Terrorism

Although many international security experts today are also overstating and exaggerating the scope of the terrorist use of WMD, most security experts have rather tended to downplay the threat of WMD terrorism for many years, despite the *Aum Shinrykio* case of 1995, for basically two reasons: (1) relatively few terrorist groups seem to be interested in inflicting mass casualties. (2) even those groups are facing substantial technical hurdles that would have to be overcome for terrorists to use those weapons. But the new level of dedication and fanaticism by giving their lives in an attack. Furthermore, they are well educated, organized

and trained for their mission and use their university education to use their knowledge for their terrorist attacks. In the age of globalisation, they operate in an international environment in very small, often independent cells and networks which are difficult to enter from outside by Western intelligence circles. The network and association with a state (if not state sponsorship) offered access to production facilities and know-how (such as biological and chemical substances) that would make the acquisition more easy, allowing those terrorist groups to narrow the technical hurdles to acquiring a WMD capability. And while the “*loose nukes*”-scenario of tactical nuclear warheads in the former Soviet Union has received wide international publicity, it is much less acknowledged the enormous stocks of unsecured biological and chemical weapons (BW and CW). But given the Western unpreparedness, the effects of BW on a target population too, would be extremely hard to counter.

According to many international terrorist experts, there is also an increasing congruence between a number of states that support international terrorism and states that have WMD programs despite the fact that there is hitherto no clear connection between the regime of *Saddam Hussein* and the *Bin-Laden* networks. Furthermore, even terrorist groups carrying out small attacks with chemical, biological, nuclear or radiological weapons could cause a very severe psychological impact — the latter is even more important than the level of violence itself. Another very troubling scenario is the concrete prospect how fundamentalism and religious intolerance can easily be politically manipulated as we see in particular in the Middle East as well as in Indonesia.

Given these new security challenges — particularly non-state sponsored international terrorism —, no traditional arms control and non-proliferation efforts are existing because they are almost all directed towards state-sponsored proliferation of WMD. This is one of those areas where many states have adopted more forcefully into some fluid mix of deterrence and defense in terms of dealing with a wide array of threats associated with WMD.

## Conclusions and Prospects

Although the US-Russian cooperation has been broadened in the aftermath of the terrorists attacks, this process only reinforces already existing trends. I don't think that the new institutional cooperation in anti-terrorist operations are sufficient to fundamentally change the nature of the future U.S.-Russian relationship in the short-term and mid-term perspective. The pattern related to *SORT* and the *ABM* treaty was already quite clear before the terrorists attacks on September 11, 2001. Both sides have established various “*channels for joint cooperation in recent years that is unprecedented by Cold War standards and goes beyond the strict formalistic approach of negotiated arms control treaties*” (*Rose Goettemoeller*). Moving from strategic offense to strategic defense as well as cooperation on missile defense technologies (*Russian-American Observation Satellite/RAMOS* program to develop early-warning satellite technology that could be applied to a missile defense system) can be seen as characteristic forums of the new strategic era of the U.S.-Russian relationship in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

As already the experiences of the *START* and *INF*-treaties as well as the Iraq-conflict have demonstrated, those regimes and treaties need effective verification mechanisms such as coercive UN inspections, including ad-hoc and on-site inspections and portal as well as perimeter monitoring which are all very challenging by themselves. Given the manifold contradictory strategic trends, neither missile defense nor missile arms control should be seen solely as the ultimate security solution. It is rather the contrast: both should be viewed as complementary approaches in international security. A strong missile non-proliferation regime can reduce the costs of defense and thus serve as another safety net or an additional option against missiles; an effective missile defense system is the last defense line or safety police against those missile states that are unwilling to sign the *MTCR* or the *ICCBM*, but willing to use them for political ends. Given the wide range of future threat scenarios linked with old and new proliferation of WMD and the lessons to learn from September 11, 2001, the international community and their nation states cannot pull all their security eggs in one

basket and then abruptly pull them out and put them in another basket when the situation it demands.

The World Community has to come up not just with acceptable, but also *more effective solutions* to the most important international security challenges that have emerged through intensive consultations and negotiations no matter how difficult and time consuming they are. This is in particular acute and important for security challenges linked with the so-called “*secondary proliferators*” such as North Korea<sup>1</sup>, Iran and Pakistan who have established themselves net distribution networks to other potential states or even international terrorist groups seeking WMD technologies to circumvent existing non-proliferation regimes to obtain the materials and equipment needed to develop WMD.

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<sup>1</sup> The interception of a shipment of high-strength aluminium tubes, for instance, last April, which could be used to build uranium enrichment centrifuges, has highlighted North Korea's covert efforts to purchase of WMD-related materials and technologies round the globe – see Joby Warrick, ‘North Korea Shops for Arms Gear in Europe’, *Wall Street Journal Europe*, 18 August 2003, p. A3.